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Abstract 
On July 6, 2004, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) required all the banks in the country to recapitalize from a 
minimum capital base of N2 billion to N25 billion. The banks were encouraged to consolidate through mergers 
and acquisition in order to meet up with the requirement. The primary objective of the recapitalization was to 
strengthen the financial sector and improve availability of domestic credit to the private sector. The prevailing 
dearth of long term funds, stunted growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), high cost of investible funds, high 
level of unemployment and inflation within the economy, seem to suggest that the dual event had no significant 
positive impact on the health status of the sector. It was against this background that this research work was 
conducted. The basic objective of the study was to investigate the impact of the recapitalization and 
consolidation on the solvency or health status of banks in the country. The method adopted for the study was 
Multi Discriminant Analysis (Altman’s Model and Enyi’s Relative Solvency Model). The study found that on 
the whole, the recapitalization and consolidation in the banking sector has not significantly improved the 
solvency status of the banking sector. The study recommended that the CBN continues with its regulatory roles 
but must strive to identify the problems contributing to the poor state of the banks even in the post consolidation 
period which many have identified as being external to the operations of the banks.  
Keywords: Bank, Solvency, Recapitalization, Multi Discriminant Analysis, Consolidation  
 
1. Introduction 
The recapitalization of the commercial banks in Nigeria from a minimum capital base of N2 billion to N25 
billion has been one of the most phenomenal event in the banking sector. The backdrop of this action being that 
banks by their large size are better able to undertake funding of large projects and that the large size of these 
banks also engendered improved customer confidence. While it may be argued that the recapitalization and other 
various reforms may have helped to build and foster a competitive and healthy financial system, it is debatable if 
there is significance difference in the status quo of the banks that survived. 
According to Aregbeyen and Oluyemi (2011) bank recapitalization and consolidation is more than mere 
reduction in the number of banks it is expected to enhance synergy, improve efficiency, induce investment 
activities and trigger productivity and welfare gains. In Nigeria, these benefits are yet to be manifested nine years 
following the event. The country is still faced with dearth of long term funds, stunted GDP, high cost of 
investible funds galloping inflation and, high level of unemployment. 
This study therefore aims at establishing the impact if any of the 2004 recapitalization and consolidation on the 
banking industry in Nigeria using the Multi Discriminant Analysis (MDA) and it is significant because it uses 
two models to draw conclusion rather than depend on one.  
This paper is divided into five parts; following the introduction is the review of relevant literature and discussion 
on conceptual issues. The third part presents the methodology that is used in gathering data and how the data 
were analyzed. Part 4 presents the data and discusses the result of the analysis while last part contains the 
conclusion and recommendation. 
 
2. Review of Related Literature and Conceptual Issues 
In the broadest sense, banking consists of safeguard and transfer of funds, lending, guaranteeing credit 
worthiness, and exchange of money. These services are provided by such financial institutions as commercial 
banks, saving banks, trust companies, finance companies, and merchant banks or other institutions engaged 
(Nnanna et al, 2004). For these institutions to perform these roles effectively, they must be very solvent – 
possessing ability to survive in the long run. 
According to Bardia (2006 as cited in Enyi 2011), “solvency is the lifeline of a business organization upon which 
its sustained growth depends. It defines the state or ability of a firm to stay financially afloat (that is, the state of 
being liquid) meeting every financial obligation as they fall due without hindrance…”  The work of Caprio & 
Klingebiel (1997) emphasizes the importance of solvency in the banking firms relative to non-bank firms. 
According to them, in a market economy, an insolvent firm will find it very difficult or impossible to raise 
additional funds for its operations. This lack of capital naturally precludes or prevents their acting on profitable 
investment opportunities and may finally force them to sell important assets in a bid to raise funds.  The failure 
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of one manufacturing firm for instance merely represents more profit making opportunity for another. This is not 
applicable in the banking system. One troubled bank could instigate a bank contagion or systemic risk. 
According to Gilbert (1988), a contagious bank panic occurs when information about troubles at some banks 
induces depositors to run on other banks, even though they have no new information about those banks (cited in 
Gup, n.d).  
Prior to 2004, the banking sector in Nigeria was perceived as being very fragile and marginal. Soludo (2004) 
identified persistent illiquidity, unprofitable operations poor assets base as very obvious problems in the sector’’. 
To contain these problems, the regulatory authorities demanded a recapitalization of the entire sector which 
could be achieved through foreign direct investments and/or bank consolidations. 
While recapitalization entails increasing the debt stock of the company or issuing additional shares through 
existing shareholders or new shareholders or a combination of the two, consolidation describes the reduction in 
banks and other deposit taking institution. The process of consolidation has been argued to enhance bank 
efficiency through cost reduction in the long run. It also reduces industry’s risk by elimination of weaker 
banks… (Aregbeyen & Oluyemi, 2011).  Consolidation in the banking system can either be market or 
government driven. The market driven consolidation sees the process as a way of broadening competitiveness 
with added comparative advantage in the global context and elimination of excess capacity more efficiently than 
bankruptcy or other forms of exit. Government induced consolidation stems from the need to resolve problems 
of financial distress in order to avoid systemic crises as well as to restrict inefficient banks (Ajayi, 2005). The 
latter was the case in Nigeria. 
2.1 Evaluation of the Banking Industry in Nigeria 
According to Adegbite (2010), a cursory look at the Nigerian financial system shows that the system has been 
performing its expected functions albeit at less than optimal levels. The incidence of recurring financial systems 
crises is testimony to the fact that the financial system’s performance still leaves much to be desired.  
The post-SAP (Structural Adjustment Program) period in Nigeria witnessed an unprecedented growth in the 
banking industry driven by attractive arbitrage opportunities in the foreign exchange market (Heiko 2007). 
According to Soyibo, et al (2004), Commercial banks increased from 29 in 1986 when financial sector reforms 
began, by over 124% to 65 in 1992. The growth in the number of merchant banks was even more spectacular: it 
increased by 350% from 12 in 1986 to 54 in 1992. Donli (n.d.) asserts further that as at the end of December 
2002, there were 90 licensed/insured banks, 282 licensed Community banks, 74 licensed Primary Mortgage 
Institutions and 6 Development Finance Institutions (DFIs). Many of these banks however became distressed due 
to poor asset base, insider abuse and illiquidity.  
2.2 Trend Analysis of Bank Recapitalization in Nigeria 
The banking sector in Nigeria has experienced recapitalization several times basically to make the sector more 
formidable and also to meet up with global demands. As posited by Phillips (1967), the more capital a bank has 
the more losses it can sustain without going bankrupt. It is on this basis that regulatory authorities will always 
insist on capital adequacy particularly for banks. The table that follows summarizes the trend in bank 
recapitalization in Nigeria. 
TABLE 2.1. Bank Capitalization in Nigeria 
Year Merchant Bank (N) Commercial Bank (N) 
1979 - 600,000 
1988 2,000,000 2,000,000 
1988 3,000,000 5,000,000 
1989 12,000,000 20,000,000 
1990 40,000,000 50,000,000 
1997 500,000,000 500,000,00 
2000 1,000,000,000 1,000,000,000 
2001 2,000,000,000 2,000,000,000 
2005 25,000,000,000 25,000,000,000 
Various Sources 
In 2004, the banking industry of Nigeria consisted of 89 banks. The industry was fragmented into relatively 
small, weakly capitalized banks with most banks having paid in capital of $10 million or less. The best 
capitalized bank had capital of $240 million as compared to Malaysia where the least capitalized bank had 
capital of $526 million at the time (CBN, 2005). It was against this background that the CBN Governor opted for 
bank recapitalization, to increase the minimum paid in capital of banks to N25 billion (US$ 173 million) from 
N2 billion (US$ 14 million). Williams (2011) views the 2004 reform as one of the biggest achievements in the 
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financial sector of the Nigeria economy since it resulted in the reduction of Nigeria motley group of mainly 
anemic 89 banks to 25 bigger, stronger and more resilient financial institutions. 
2.3 Empirical Literature on Bank Recapitalization and Consolidation 
Empirical evidence on the impact of the bank recapitalization and consolidation in Nigeria varies. Nuraddeen 
(2011) studied all 24 banks that survived the recapitalization and consolidation process using the t-test analysis. 
The result of his analysis showed that the event had no significant impact on the profitability and efficiency of 
the banks. Ebinmiobowei and Sophia (2011) using an explorative method to study the impact of the 
recapitalization and consolidation in the sector noted that the event did not meet the desired objectives of 
liquidity, capital adequacy and corporate governance. Pat and James (2011) however noted that the exercise had 
a positive impact on the market capitalization and all share index of the Nigerian Stock exchange. Adegbaju and 
Olokoyo (2008) studying the impact of the 2001 recapitalization found a significant difference in bank 
performance after the recapitalization. Their study employed secondary data which were analyzed using both 
descriptive e.g. means and standard deviations and analytical techniques such as the t-test and the test of equality 
of means.  
Other studies such as those by Berger et al. (1999) suggest that bank consolidations do not significantly improve 
the performance and efficiency of the participant banks. Sawada and Okazaki (2004) studying the effects of  
policy-promoted consolidation on the stability of the financial system in Japan confirmed that policy-promoted 
consolidations mitigated the financial crisis by enhancing the ability of the bank to collect deposits, under the 
condition that the financial system was exposed to serious negative shocks. However, their study also noted that 
policy-promoted consolidations had negative aspects as they were accompanied by large organizational costs and 
decreased bank profitability. 
 
3. METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
The method of analysis adopted for the study is Multi Discriminant Analysis (MDA) or multivariate model 
which consists of a linear combination of variables that provides the best distinction between failing and 
nonfailing firms (Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006 as cited in Wong and Ng, 2010). The discriminant score is simply an 
ordinal measure that allows the ranking of firms and to separate creditworthy firms from impecunious ones.  
The study was carried out in Nigeria and it covered nine banks within the country. The basic objective is to 
determine the impact if any of the 2004 recapitalization and consolidation of the banking industry. Secondary 
data extracted from the financial statements of the selected banks were used for the analysis. The sampling frame 
of the study is limited to the commercial banks, while the sample size is restricted to nine commercial banks 
which include – First Bank Plc (FBN), Guaranty Trust Bank (GTB), Union Bank of Nigeria (UBN), Fidelity 
bank (FBN), United Bank for Africa Plc (UBA), Zenith Bank (ZBN), Access Bank (ABN), Diamond Bank 
(DBN) and Wema Bank (WBN).  These banks are considered to be the major players in the banking industry in 
terms of their capital base. Wema bank was also chosen as a major regional bank particularly in the Western part 
of the country. The study covered a period of ten years (2001 – 2005) for the pre-2004 bank reform period and 
(2006 – 2010) for the post-2004 reform period. The inclusion of 2005 in the pre-2004 period is because banks 
were expected to have fully complied with the recapitalization process on or before December 25, 2005. The 
variables used in the study  included the total assets (TA) of the banks, their working capital (WC), retained 
earnings (RE), earnings before interest and tax (EBIT), market value of equity (MVE), total liabilities (TL), 
annual sales or deposits by customers, mark –up ratio (MUR), and total operating cost (TOC). These valued 
were averaged over the five year period for each bank and the mean values used to remove outliers and to make 
the data more manageable. The study examined the health status of the banks in the pre and post 2004 
recapitalization by comparing the results of the analysis and drew conclusions on the impact of the event on the 
health or solvency status of the banking industry. 
The selected models for the study are: 
3.1 Altman’s Bankruptcy Prediction Model 
Altman bankruptcy prediction model was initially developed in 1968 by Edward I. Altman where he utilized data 
drawn from large US companies, all of which were outside the construction industry. The main idea was the 
combination of several weighted financial ratios to provide a single index (known as a Z-score), that classified 
businesses as failing, at risk, or non-failing. Because of the large number of variables found to be significant 
indicators of corporate financial problems in previous univariate analyses, Altman (1983) decided to employ a 
list of 22 ratios which was considered as potentially helpful variables for the purpose. From this list of 22 
variables, five ratios were selected as the best predictors of corporate bankruptcy.  
This ratio which uses the Z value to represent overall index of corporate financial health, is used mostly to 
determine if the company is a good investment since it gives a pretty good snapshot of corporate financial health. 
Built out of five weighted financial ratios, the formula is as follows: 
Z = 1.2X1 + 1.4X2 + 3.3X3 + 0.6X4 + 0.999X5 
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Where 
X1 = Working capital divided by total assets (WC/TA) 
X2 = Retained earnings divided by total assets (RE/TA) 
X3 = Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by total assets (EBIT/TA) 
X4 = Market value of equity divided by the book value of total debt or Total Liabilities      (MVE/TL). 
X5 = Sales (Total Deposits) divided by total assets. ( Total Deposits/TA) 
The decision rule: 
i. For Z < 1.81: Bank is within the bankruptcy region 
ii. For 1.81 < Z > 2.675: Bank has high potential for bankruptcy 
iii. For 2.675 < Z < 2.99: Bank is fairly strong with Low bankruptcy potential  
iv. For Z > 2.99: Bank is strong and solvent enough to help fund investment activities. 
This study expects that the Z-score values of the banks in the post reform era should be 2.99 and above or should 
be significantly greater than the Z-score in the pre 2004 consolidation and recapitalization era. Where this holds 
true, then the study will conclude that the reforms have significantly improved the health and solvency status of 
the banks. 
3.2 Enzi’s Relative Solvency Ratio (RSR) Model 
The Enyi’s Relative Solvency Model was developed in 2005 by Enyi Patrick Enyi. The model has found ready 
application in both the manufacturing and service industry. Its ability to capture the chance of insolvency and 
point of insolvency of a firm makes it a very valuable tool in the hands of researchers.  
The RSR model depends basically on an organization’s ability to recover costs and make profit. It works with 
the following concepts as defined Enyi (2005, 2007, and 2011). 
i. Operational Break Even Point (OBEP): This defines the point where total earnings are just equal to 
the total operating cost of the business. The OBEP is measured in number of production/activity cycles 
which may be in days, weeks or months per year. 
OBEP = (1+m) / 2m 
                                                   m = mark-up ratio 
Since the production cycles in this study are measured in weeks, an OBEP of 10 for instance means that 
a bank must have enough working capital to cover 10 weeks of operations. 
ii. Operational Mark-up Rate (MUR): This indicates the competence and ability of the management of a 
firm to recover costs and maximize profit. 
MUR = Profit Before Tax (PBT) / Total Operating Cost (TOC) 
iii. Required Working Capital (WCR): This is the volume of working capital adequate to sustain the 
volume of activities at the operational break-even point. The formula is: 
WCR = (TOC / 52) * OBEP 
 52 represent the number of weeks in a year; assuming that all firms stock up for at least  one week’s 
  operation. 
iv. The Relative Solvency Ratio (RSR): This measures the liquidity of a business in terms of the 
availability of adequate working capital. 
RSR = Available Working Capital / Working Capital Required  
A RSR of 5 for instance means that a bank has 4 times more WC than it requires; 0.54  means the bank has 
only 54% of the total working capital required for its operations and projected activities; while a negative RSR 
such -3 means  the bank lacks three times the value of WC needed to maintain its operations.  
v. Chance of Insolvency (COI): This is used to predict the likelihood of insolvency and the possible 
stage that insolvency is expected to occur. It is measured as: 
COI = 1 – RSR 
 This is a probabilistic measurement expressed in decimal fraction between 0 and 1.  
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RSR and COI interpretation Table 
Relative Solvency 
Ratio 
Chance of Insolvency 
(COI) 
Interpretation 
0 1 Bank is bankrupt 
0.01 0.99 - 0.75 
Company is insolvent and tending towards 
bankruptcy. Company needs to be financially and 
managerially over hauled. 
0.26 - 0.50 0.74 - 0.50 
Company is technically insolvent and needs to 
improve on profitability. 
0.51 - 0.75 0.49 - 0.25 
Company has poor fiscal health and needs to improve 
on profitability. 
0.76 - 0.99 0.24 - 0.01 
Company has fair fiscal health but needs to improve 
on profitability. 
1.0 and above 0 and less than 0 Company is fiscally healthy. 
vi. Point of Insolvency (POI): The result of this measurement reveals how long the present stock of 
working capital can last before it is completely exhausted assuming no other fund comes by way of 
revenue or loan during the period. 
POI = OBEP * RSR 
 POI of 15 for instance indicates that the bank will become bankrupt if there is no inflow  of cash from 
its  operations for 15 weeks. 
vii. Production Cycles (PDC): This defines the relative cost that will be able to cover each bank’s 
operations for one full working week. PDC of N120, 000 for instance means that in a week, to 
successfully carry out its activities, the bank will spend a total of N120, 000 on the assumption that its 
production cycles are identical and constant.  
  PDC = Total Operating Cost (TOC)/52 (weeks) 
 
4. Results and Discussions 
Tables 4.1 Z-scores for the selected banks Pre-2004 Bank reform period.  
TABLE 4.1: ALTMAN’S Z-SCORE FOR THE SELECTED BANKS (PRE-2004 REFORMS) 
BANKS X1 *1.2 X2 * 1.4 X3 * 3.3 X4 * 0.6 X5 * 0.999 Z-SCORE 
ABN 0.10240795 0.005011714 0.0614647 0.27373161 0.153696349 0.59631232 
DBN 0.22707275 0.008811981 0.08557295 0 0.110743477 0.43220116 
FDN 0.16700089 0.023912745 0.14296245 0 0.191136675 0.52501276 
FBN 0.10764121 0.009084874 0.11201435 0.36448903 0.141673023 0.73490250 
GTB 0.15012267 0.012295915 0.14205006 0.70025865 0.160511442 1.16523874 
UBN 0.07614074 0.003212552 0.09771887 0.22273218 0.118737166 0.5185415 
UBA 0.05655757 0.004842358 0.06796711 0.35367416 0.089160168 0.57220136 
WBN 0.46393014 0.005982791 0.08210136 0.20676969 0.160685630 0.91946962 
ZBN 0.07256109 0.012993332 0.11642381 0.00365777 0.113697743 0.31933375 
Source: Researcher’s Computation based on values extracted and averaged from banks’ audited financial 
statements 2001- 2005 
From table 4.1, the summary of the Altman scale reveals that 100% of the banks understudied in this work were 
distressed and unhealthy with Z-score values far below 2.99. This result is congruent with Lemo (2005) which 
noted that there was the threat of systemic distress in the banking sector. It was this perceived deplorable state of 
the sector that created the need for the recapitalization process.  
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Table 4.2: Relative Solvency Ratios for the selected banks Pre-2004 Bank reform period. 
BANKS AWC TOC PBT MUR PC OBEP WCR RSR COI POI 
ABN 2393150 3792041 522311.2 0.14 72924 4.13 301180 7.95 -6.95 32.82 
DBN 13387004 5561930 1834519 0.33 106960 2.02 215622 62.09 -61.09 125.16 
FDN 3502130 3724553 1090191 0.29 71626 2.21 158165 22.14 -21.14 48.89 
FBN 26651 32049.5 10085 0.31 616 2.09 1288 20.70 -19.70 43.24 
GTB 11826430 25954332 4069266 0.16 499122 3.69 1841294 6.42 -5.42 23.69 
UBN 9854.6 18624.2 4306.4 0.23 358 2.66 954 10.33 -9.33 27.51 
UBA 20420.4 28721.6 9530 0.33 552 2.01 1108 18.42 -17.42 36.97 
WBN 24245863 7755750 1560281 0.20 149149 2.99 445265 54.45 -53.45 162.56 
ZBN 9533630 12381700 5562418 0.45 238110 1.61 384066 24.82 -23.82 40.04 
Source: Researcher’s Computation based on averaged values from banks’ audited financial statements 2001-
2005 
Table 4.2 on the other hand reveals that all the banks were very healthy before the 2004 bank reforms since they 
all have Relative Solvency Ratios (RSR) which are all far above 1. The probability of the banks becoming 
insolvent as revealed by the Chance of Insolvency (COI) ratio is also very low. This is to be expected because 
the banks examined in this study were the major player in the banking industry with over 50 percent of the entire 
industry’s deposits. However, the study will conclude that the recapitalization significantly improved their 
solvency status if the RSR values in the post recapitalization era are much greater. 
Solvency Status of Banks after the 2004 Reforms 
TABLE 4.3: Z-SCORE VALUES FOR THE SELECTED BANKS (POST 2004 REFORMS). 
BANKS X1 *1.2 X2 * 1.4 X3 * 3.3 X4 * 0.6 X5 * 0.999 Z-SCORE 
ABN 0.15958254 0.018690728 0.08312723 0.07314261 0.338126051 0.67266916 
DBN 0.19266898 0.010663836 0.04191433 0.24425725 0.103636582 0.59314098 
FDN 0.25557894 0.019705620 0.06293610 0.17810333 0.092591620 0.60891562 
FBN 0.24403945 0.015121601 0.06562683 0.11765538 0.224248382 0.66669164 
GTB 0.25426780 0.023450381 0.11532553 0.39416928 0.121767532 0.90898052 
UBN 0.10803940 -0.017682946 -0.0099506 0.33697823 0.109355545 0.52673960 
UBA 0.10510609 0.012501504 0.06984202 0.30426919 0.113849095 0.60556790 
WBN 0.06590719 -0.067453964 -0.2785309 0.41994673 0.130263534 0.27013255 
ZBN 0.40414645 0.011986771 0.08189783 0.13236578 0.116327445 0.74672427 
Source: Resercher’s Computation from values extracted and averaged from banks’ audited financial statements 
2006 -2010 
Table 4.3 which has the Z-scores after the 2004 bank reforms reveals very similar Z values for the banks after 
recapitalization and consolidation in the industry. A comparison of the two eras will suffice to draw logical 
conclusions. 
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Table 4.4: ALTMAN’S Z VALUES FOR THE TWO ERA 
BANKS Z-SCORE (PRE 2004 REFORMS)  Z-SCORE (POST 2004 REFORMS) 
ABN 0.60 0.67 
DBN 0.43 0.59 
FDN 0.53 0.61 
FBN 0.73 0.67 
GTB 1.17 0.91 
UBN 0.52 0.53 
UBA 0.57 0.61 
WBN 0.92 0.27 
ZBN 0.32 0.75 
Source: Researcher’s Computation, 2012 
Table 4.5 shows that none of the banks recorded a significant improvement in its solvency status after the 
recapitalization and consolidation process. None of the banks after the recapitalization made it into the healthy 
region. Three banks - FBN, GTB, and WBN – had their Z-scores worse off after the activity.  The result agrees 
with empirical literature which suggests that bank consolidations do not significantly improve the performance 
and efficiency of the participating banks (Berger et al (1999), Amel et al (2002) cited in Somoye, 2008).  Also 
According to Haynes and Thompson (1999)  the gains from a consolidation process may not necessarily be the 
result of economies of scale but rather due to the  merger process in which assets are transferred to the control of 
more productive managements. Where this is lacking the process may yet be an effort in futility. 
 Table 4.5 ENYI’S RELATIVE SOLVENCY RATIOS (POST-2004 BANK REFORMS)  
BANKS AWC TOC PBT MUR (M) PDC OBEP WCR RSR COI POI 
ABN 78111312 184007178 14795824 0.08 3538600 6.72 23773067 3.29 -2.29 22 
DBN 74724338 25120715 5911261 0.24 483091 2.62 1268025 58.93 -57.93 155 
FDN 75920684 26240335 6798329 0.26 504622 2.43 1226186 61.92 -60.92 151 
FBN 247828200 249314600 24234800 0.10 4794512 5.64 27058935 9.16 -8.16 52 
GTB 160587608 65892046 26485821 0.40 1267155 1.74 2209806 72.67 -71.67 127 
UBN 70928250 88612500 -2375500 -0.03 1704087 -18.15 -30931448 -2.29 3.29 42 
UBA 110487400 117060000 26697400 0.23 2251154 2.69 6060890 18.23 -17.23 49 
WBN 8348546 32650363 -12829768 -0.39 627892 -0.77 -485012 -17.21 18.21 13 
ZBN 440209929 119763028 32438499 0.27 2303135 2.35 5403158 81.47 -80.47 191 
Source: Researcher’s Computation based on averaged values from banks’ audited financial statements 2006 -
2010 
The RSR as before shows that all the banks except, UBN and WBN are fiscally very healthy. However, a 
comparative analysis of the two periods will help prove whether or not there has been a significant improvement 
in the ratios following the reforms.  
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Table 4.6: RELATIVE SOLVENCY RATIOS FOR THE TWO PERIODS 
BANKS RSR PRE 2004 REFORMS RSR POST 2004 REFORMS 
ABN 7.95 3.29 
DBN 62.09 58.93 
FDN 22.14 61.92 
FBN 20.70 9.16 
GTB 6.42 72.67 
UBN 18.42 -2.29 
UBA 16.48 18.23 
WBN 54.45 -17.21 
ZBN 24.82 81.47 
 Source: Researcher’s Computation, 2012 
Table 4.6 reveals that 5 out of the 9 (55%) of the selected banks had their solvency status affected negatively. 
Out of the 5 banks, 2 – UBN and WBN had negative ratios while only 4 banks showed improved RSR. This is 
against expectation that all the banks examined must record significant improvement in their solvency status. 
Further examination using the COI values corroborates the results of the RSR values. 
Table 4.7: COI FOR THE SELECTED BANKS FOR THE TWO PERIODS 
BANKS COI PRE 2004 REFORMS COI POST 2004 REFORMS 
ABN -6.95 -2.29 
DBN -61.09 -57.93 
FDN -21.14 -60.92 
FBN -19.70 -8.16 
GTB -5.42 -71.67 
UBN -17.42 3.29 
UBA -15.48 -17.23 
WBN -53.45 18.21 
ZBN -23.82 -80.47 
Source: Researcher’s Computation, 2012 
Form the table, two banks – UBN and WBN show clear indication of distress with very high possibility of 
becoming bankrupt. The implication also is that these banks are depending heavily on external funds to run their 
affairs. These two banks also recorded considerable losses in their operations such that their averaged retained 
earnings before interest and tax were both negative for the post reform era (See the values of PBT for these two 
banks in table 4.5). From table 4.5 it is also obvious that WBN has the worst POI of 13 meaning that if for 
thirteen week the banks get no cash inflow from its operations, it will go bankrupt. 
Table 4.9: MARK UP RATIOS FOR THE SELECTED BANKS FOR THE TWO PERIODS  
BANKS MUR (M) PRE 2004 REFORM MUR (M) POST 2004 REFORM 
ABN 0.14 0.08 
DBN 0.33 0.24 
FDN 0.29 0.26 
FBN 0.31 0.10 
GTB 0.16 0.40 
UBN 0.33 -0.03 
UBA 0.30 0.23 
WBN 0.20 -0.39 
ZBN 0.45 0.27 
Source: Researcher’s Computation, 2012 
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The MUR shows the relationship between the banks total operating cost and gross earnings. A reducing MUR is 
an indication that a bank’s health is deteriorating. The table above presents the MURs for the two eras and it 
reveals that the MUR of eight out of the nine selected banks dropped. This clearly indicates that the banks 
operating expenses after the 2004 reform have been on the increase. This agrees with the findings by Okazaki 
and Swada (2006) that policy promoted consolidations also have negative aspects as they were accompanied by 
large organizational costs (branch expansion and training) and decrease in bank profitability. 
The finding from this study agrees with other studies that consolidation of banks in particular may not 
necessarily be a sufficient tool for financial stability or sustainable development and neither do bank 
consolidations significantly improve the performance and efficiency of the participant banks (Somoye, 2006; 
Berger et al.;1999, and Amel et al. 2002).   Ezeoha (2008) also corroborated this view by asserting that the bank 
recapitalization and other activities undertaken to strengthen the banking sector in Nigeria may never have a 
lasting and obvious impact since most of the problems affecting this sector are external to its operations. 
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendation 
Bank recapitalization which induced the consolidation of banks has brought immense transformation to the 
banking sector and the progress toward cleaning up the weakest banks is a major achievement that would 
strengthen confidence in the system and improve its ability to support the real economy. However it is evident 
that potential insolvency still looms in the sector. Two banks from the perspective of the two models show clear 
signs of distress. The regulatory authorities must be up and on its task to prevent any form of systemic failure. 
The study recommends the following: 
1. That the Central Bank of Nigeria and its cohorts continue close monitoring of banks’ solvency 
positions, with a view to detecting and correcting at an early stage any signs of renewed deterioration 
2. That banking sector consolidation be market driven rather than government driven. This is because 
policy or government driven consolidation may just be a matter of policy which may never yield any 
beneficial outcome.  
3.  The notion of “too big to fall” was proven wrong in Japan. Therefore, it is important to note that having 
mega banks is not an end in itself. Several challenges may likely arise which may be disastrous to the 
sector. Therefore, the entire sector must be handled with care. Policies and reform programmes must be 
such that will protect the system  
4. To prevent further deterioration in the sector, the regulatory authorities must ensure that the banks are 
supervised effectively and all loop-holes blocked to avoid abuse. They must also be open in their 
activities since most of the arguments  surrounding the event centered more on the structure and the 
implementation mechanism, and not on the desirability of the exercise 
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APPENDIX 
Average Values Of Variables In The Pre 2004 Recapitalization And Consolidation  Era 
Variables/Bank ABN DBN FDN FBN GTB 
Gross Earnings 4314352.2 7842459.6 4814744 42134500 15188998 
EBIT 522311.2 1834518.8 1090191.25 10085000 4069266.2 
Operating Cost 3792041 5561929.8 3724552.75 32049500 25954331.8 
Total Assets 28042552 70745630.8 25164868.25 297109250 94534127 
Total Liabilities 23641874.4 67375572.5 16246416.5 261511500 82289767.4 
Current Assets 25910282.8 73575505.75 24116337.75 287581500 91281788.2 
Current Liabilities 23517132.6 60188501.5 20614208.25 260930500 79455358.4 
Working Capital 2393150.2 13387004.25 3502129.5 26651000 11826429.8 
Retained Earnings 100386.6 445292.25 429829.3333 1928000 830274 
MVE 10785880.5 NA NA 158863457 96040202 
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Variables/Bank UBN UBA WBN ZBN 
Gross Earnings 38251600 18661000 10087367.6 17944118 
EBIT 9530000 4306400 1560280.6 5562418.2 
Operating Cost 28721600 14354600 7755749.8 12381699.8 
Total Assets 321831400 209088200 62714259 157665168.8 
Total Liabilities 291164000 194400600 53538502.6 141235681.2 
Current Assets 310030200 203513000 59533618.2 150573663.4 
Current Liabilities 289609800 193658400 39964275.2 141040033 
Working Capital 20420400 9854600 24245862.5 9533630.4 
Retained Earnings 738500 723200 268004.5 1463282.75 
MVE 108085988 114590781 18450233 861013 
 
Average Values Of Variables In The Post 2004 Recapitalization And Consolidation Era 
Variables/Bank ABN DBN FDN FBN GTB 
Gross Earnings 198803002 48281318.8 33038664.2 273549400 92377866.4 
EBIT 14795823.8 5911261 6798328.8 24234800 26485820.6 
Operating Cost 184007178 25120714.8 26240335.4 249314600 65892045.8 
Total Assets 587367340 465405519.6 356464499.8 1218630200 757882559.8 
Total Liabilities 468044066 371588676 265464103.6 984636800 625425950 
Current Assets 543003382 434235188.8 340758393.2 1188054800 726960205 
Current Liabilities 464892071 359510851 264837709.6 940226600 566372596.8 
Working Capital 78111311.6 74724337.8 75920683.6 247828200 160587608.2 
Retained Earnings 7841659.4 3545005.8 5017395.8 13162600 12694739 
MVE 57056606.8 151272049.2 78800069.2 193079695.6 410872828 
Variables/Bank UBN UBA WBN ZBN 
Gross Earnings 86237000 143757400 19820594.8 152201527.4 
EBIT -2375500 26697400 -12829768.4 32438499.2 
Operating Cost 88612500 117060000 32650363.2 119763028.2 
Total Assets 787804250 1261438600 152005504.8 1307080422 
Total Liabilities 698621500 1105575400 158440338 1062297396 
Current Assets 756333750 1195823400 139121316.8 1256782033 
Current Liabilities 685405500 1085336000 130772771 816572103.6 
Working Capital 70928250 110487400 8348545.8 440209929 
Retained Earnings -9950500 11264200 -7323838.5 11191195.8 
MVE 392367057 560654215.8 110894169.4 234353033 
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